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Bias, Batson, and "Backstrikes": Snyder v. Louisiana
Through a Glass, Starkly
"In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons
equally, we must treat them differently."
Justice Harry Blackmun
I. INTRODUCTION: SUSPICION & SANCTION
Two unspoken, unwritten words wreak profoundly harmful
effects on jury selection, as well as on the trials and verdicts that
follow: "whites only."' This phrase may not be posted above jury
boxes, but systematic exclusion of minorities from jury service
sends the message. Discriminatory misuse of the peremptory
challenge2 effectively etches the words into courtroom walls, as
vivid as the eagle in the American seal.
It is unconstitutional to strike jurors because of their skin color,
a principle the U.S. Supreme Court established and repeatedly
affirmed throughout history.3 This line of jurisprudence, which
stretches over more than a century, demonstrates the Court's
continuing concern with the deeply rooted, intractable problem of
racism. 4 In the most recent example, Snyder v. Louisiana, an all-
white jury convicted a black defendant of first-degree murder and
sentenced him to death after five black people were struck from the
venire. The Supreme Court remanded the case and granted a newtrial to the defendant, Allen Snyder.6
Copyright 2010, by BRUCE HAMILTON.
1. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (noting the "harm from
discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and
the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that
purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine confidence in the
fairness of our system ofjustice").
2. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 795 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (noting the
"constitutional imperative of race neutrality in jury selection"); Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); see also
Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1807, 1812 (1993).
4. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304 (finding that excluding black people from
juries is "practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to
securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to
secure to all others").
5. Snyder v. Louisiana (Snyder 11), 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
6. Snyder v. Louisiana, 982 So. 2d 763 (La. 2008).
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Snyder marks a rare reversal by the Court of a murder
conviction, and the seven-two decision is particularly unusual
because racism during jury selection caused the reversal. Snyder's
prosecutor had removed a juror whom he previously empaneled by
using a type of peremptory challenge called a backstrike.8 The
Louisiana Supreme Court, which twice before had examined the
record, did not discern prejudice in the prosecutor's peremptory
challenges.9 But the U.S. Sugreme Court inferred discriminatory
intent from a single strike. The Court did not question the
backstrike as a valid procedure, but its decision was based on the
only backstruck juror." Writing for the majority, Justice Alito
deemed the prosecutor's explanation for striking the student
"suspicious."' As the result of Snyder suggests, the backstrike
itself incurs suspicion.
Snyder brings to the fore an issue Louisiana's justice system
must address. A prosecutor's dismissal of a juror whom he
previously accepted deserves heightened judicial scrutiny,
especially if his reason is unconvincing. Backstrikes enable
lawyers to eject jurors long after they have been questioned and
tendered. Delaying a peremptory challenge this way can disguise a
discriminatory pattern. As a procedural tool, the backstrike can be
deceptive.
Racism is often deceitful. It can hide in plain sight, clothed by
colorblindness. It also can be mistakenly read into neutral behavior
that appears discriminatory. Shortly after the Snyder decision, the
prosecutor insisted that the U.S. Supreme Court was wrong and
that "race was never an issue" in the case. 13 Ultimately, his
7. Joan Biskupic, Court Tosses Verdict, Death Sentence in Race-tinged
Case; Blacks Were Cut from Jury in La. Murder Trial, USA TODAY, Mar. 20,
2008, at A12.
8. A backstrike is a type of peremptory challenge used to strike jurors after
they have been accepted onto the jury panel but before the panel has been
sworn. Snyder 111, 552 U.S. 472.
9. See State v. Snyder (Snyder If), 942 So. 2d 484 (La. 2006), cert.
granted, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007); State v. Snyder (Snyder 1), 750 So. 2d 832 (La.
1999), cert. granted, 545 U.S. 1137 (2005). The Louisiana Supreme Court
considered Snyder's appeal in Snyder I then reconsidered it on remand from the
U.S. Supreme Court in Snyder I.
10. Snyder II, 552 U.S. at 474.
11. Id. at 477.
12. Id. at 482.
13. Paul Purpura, Supreme Court Casts Out Murder Conviction; Race Used
in Picking Jury in St. Rose Man 's Death, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar.
20, 2008, at Al (the prosecutor said, "With all due respect to the U.S. Supreme
Court, I think the majority was wrong on this one .... Race was never an issue
in this case. An all-black jury would have convicted Allen Snyder on the
evidence presented, which was overwhelmingly against him").
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motivation is moot. The Court could not tolerate the appearance of
racism, even though its existence could not be proven. Snyder
shows that courts must avoid even the appearance of prejudice in
jury selection. A discriminatory effect can be worse than a
discriminatory cause because it erodes the public's faith in the
justice system.
This Note analyzes the holding of Snyder, assesses its impact
on the jurisprudence of discrimination in juror selection, and
proposes practical and legislative changes. Part II describes the
background of peremptory challenges, explains the significance of
Batson v. Kentucky and Snyder, and explores the background of
backstrikes in Louisiana. Part III analyzes Snyder in the context of
backstrikes, demeanor justifications, deference to trial judges, and
mixed motive analysis. Part IV proposes solutions to make
peremptory challenges less problematic. It concludes that
backstrikes do too much damage to the justice system and should
be banned in Louisiana.
II. BACKGROUND: FROM SHIELD TO SWORD
Traditionally, the peremptory challenge was considered an
"arbitrary and capricious right" to be "exercised with full
freedom. ' '14 Modem jurisprudence restricts this right. The
challenge need not be explained "unless the challenge was used to
discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity or sex." 15 In other
words, its use can be capricious no longer. This increased
restriction reflects a growing awareness of, and reaction to, its
misuse. Forged as a shield against bias, the peremptory challenge
has been sharpened into a sword.
A. Free Reign Fosters Abuse
The peremptory challenge was created as a tacit challenge for
cause, 16 a device typically used to dismiss prospective jurors who
cannot be impartial, for reasons such as having a relationship to the
defendant, defense counsel, or district attorney.' 7 At common law,
the peremptory challenge was used to dismiss jurors whose
14. Brian W. Stoltz, The Peremptory Challenge: Letting Lawyers Enforce
the Principles of Batson, 85 TEx. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2007) (citing Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 245 (8th ed. 2004).
16. Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A
Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 809, 820 (1997).
17. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 797 (1998).
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obvious biases made them unfit for jury service.18 By excludingthose citizens who showed conspicuous prejudice or
predisposition, British courts protected juries' impartiality. But the
modem use of the peremptory challenge has a contrary effect.19
Rather than pursuing an open-minded panel, American lawyers
look for jurors whom they see as sympathetic to their side. Whenboth sides try to tilt a jury in their direction, however, the effect is
not equality: "Two sets of partial jurors do not an impartial jury
make." 20 A strategy of seeking slanted jurors fosters a fundamental
imbalance in the panel's deliberations.
Moreover, lawyers' own leanings permeate the jury selectionprocess. With limited time and information about each prospectivejuror, lawyers typically rely on preconceptions, excluding people
based on certain characteristics instead of challenging them on the
basis of an articulated or demonstrable bias. Discrimination injury
selection is legitimate and acceptable, as long as it is not based on
race, ethnicity, or sex.2 1 But the subjective motivation for a
peremptory challenge is impossible to prove.
The peremptory challenge's purpose is to eliminate jurors
whose prejudice is hidden or nonobvious.2 2 Lawyers therefore rely
on intuition or some telling outward sign of a potential juror's
predilections, even subtle reactions to questions such as a twitch,
glance, or frown.23 The challenge gives lawyers the power to strike
jurors for virtually any reason, but this power to discriminate freely
is easily misused. For example, the peremptory challenge
historically has been used to keep black people from serving on
juries.24 It enabled and perpetuated racial discrimination that
developed out of America's slaveholding history.
Before the Civil War, African-Americans were not permitted to
25
serve on juries. Congress made it a criminal offense to exclude
people from jury service based on their race in the Civil Rights Act
of 1875.26 In 1880, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Strauder
v. West Virginia that state laws on juror qualification were being
18. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 819.
19. Id. at 865 (noting the "use of peremptory challenges tends [] to result in
juries with six pro-prosecution and six pro-defense jurors").
20. Id.
21. Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1451 (2009).
22. JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND PoLrIcs 50 (1992).
23. Id.
24. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 830.
25. NEIL J. KRESSEL & DoRir F. KRESSEL, STACK AND SWAY: THE NEW
SCIENCE OF JURY CONSULTING 172 (2002) (noting that the only state that
allowed black jurors to serve before the war was Massachusetts).
26. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
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used to prevent African-Americans from serving.2 7 The Court held
that excluding black jurors because of race violated the Equal
Protection Clause, but its decision evoked the racist tenor of the
times.28 When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the Court
said, the "colored race" was "abject and ignorant, and in that
condition was unfitted to command the respect of those who had
superior intelligence.,
29
When desegregated jury pools became inevitable, southern
states used the peremptory challenge to keep black people off
juries.30 Higher courts began to intervene, but political leaders used
other discriminatory selection procedures to sidestep the law and
ensure mostly white or all-white4uries.31 Effective reform did not
occur until the civil rights era. I1965, an eighteen-year-old
black man named Robert Swain challenged his sexual assault
conviction and death sentence in Alabama because his jury was
entirely white. 33 The Supreme Court rejected his appeal because it
found no intentional effort to exclude black jurors, though all eight
of the empaneled black jurors had been struck by peremptory
challenges.3 4 The Court held that the challenges reflected "no
studied attempt to include or exclude a specified number of
Negroes., 35 To prove peremptory challenges were used purposefully
to exclude African-Americans, the Court said, a challenger would
have to show systematic abuse over time.
3 6
Congress reacted to the decision by passing the Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968, which prohibited the dismissal of federal
jurors on the basis of race skin color, religion, gender, national
origin, or economic status.3 The Act codified the Supreme Court's
stance against discrimination in juror selection.38 But minority
exclusion from federal juries continued despite the ban.39 For
example, in fifty-three criminal trials between 1972 and 1973 in
27. 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880).
28. Id. at 306.
29. Id.
30. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 829.
31. KRESSEL & KRESSEL, supra note 25, at 173-74.
32. Id. at 174.
33. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 209.
36. Id. at 227.
37. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 833; 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6) (2006).
38. Heather Davenport, Blinking Reality: Race and Criminal Jury Selection
in Light of Ovalle, Miller-El, and Johnson, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 949, 962 (2006).
39. HIROSHI FUKARI, EDGAR W. BUTLER & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND
THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 70
(1993).
2010] NOTE 967
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, prosecutors used sixty-nine percent of their peremptory
challenges to dismiss black jurors, though only twenty-five percent
of the eligible jurors on the venires were black.4
As State v. Washington demonstrates, some state prosecutors
routinely excluded black jurors.4 1 In the 1979 case, a black
defendant in Louisiana appealed his armed robbery conviction
because the East Baton Rouge Parish prosecutor used peremptory• 42
challenges to strike the first twelve prospective black jurors. The
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the
prosecutor openly acknowledged that he struck black jurors
without examining their qualifications or ability to serve on the
panel.43 He explained himself in these words:
I have found through experience, some 23 years in the
district attorney's office, that blacks, where you have a
black defendant, will generally vote not guilty, in spite of
the strength of the state's case . . . I find, not without
justification, particularly young blacks, they are very
resentful of the white establishment.
44
The court held that it was unjustified and unconstitutional to
assume that all black jurors are so biased that they would ignore
evidence. 45 But one dissenting justice approved of the prosecutor's
method, calling him "one of the most capable tacticians" in the46 ,
state. The justice was "unable to criticize him for performing his
duties in accordance with the law" and found fault with the
criminal justice system, not the prosecutor.47
Although the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly has articulated the• • • 48 .
principle that juror discrimination is illegal, litigants had no way to
pursue a remedy for violations of that principle until 1986. When the
Court decided the watershed case of Batson, it established a
procedural framework to protest such discrimination.
49
40. Id.
41. 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979).
42. Id. at 1163.
43. Id. at 1162.
44. Id. at 1163.
45. Id. at 1164.
46. Id. at 1165 (Blanche, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); J.E.B. v. Alabama,
511 U.S. 127 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v.
Leeville, 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
49. Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
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B. The Batson Breakthrough
An all-white jury convicted James Kirkland Batson, an
African-American, of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen
goods. 50 During voir dire, the prosecutor used his peremptory
challenges to strike all four African-Americans in the venire.' The
U.S. Supreme Court held that the intentional exclusion of potential
jurors on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution.
52
The Court also reiterated that a defendant has no right to be tried
by a jury composed, in whole or in part, by members of his race.53
In other words, it can be constitutional for an all-white jury to try a
black man, but it is unconstitutional to use the peremptory challenge
to purposefully exclude black jurors solely because they are black.
Batson redefined the peremptory challenge; the Court's decision
recognized it as a valid, useful, and beneficial trial procedure.54
Batson also established a three-step procedure through which
objections to peremptory challenges should be raised.55 To initiate
the process, a party must establish: (1) a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination by showing that he or she is a member of
a "cognizable" racial group; (2) that the prosecutor has used
peremptory challenges to remove members of that race from the
venire; and (3) that the facts and "relevant circumstances" raise an
inference of discriminatory intent.56 The burden then shifts to the
prosecutor to rebut the defense's case by providing a race-neutral
reason for exercising the peremptory challenge. 57 Finally, the trial
judge must evaluate the prosecutor's stated reason for the challenge,
decide whether it is credible, and grant or disallow the objection.
Batson not only created a simpler mechanism for protesting a
peremptory challenge, but it also subjected a lawyer's reasons for
striking jurors to judicial scrutiny. By making those reasons
assailable immediately, it made such protests much easier and also
added a level of accountability to the exercise of peremptory
challenges. They could no longer be used with full freedom, and
the subjective motivations for their use could be called into
question in an adversarial context. Because it was the prosecutor
50. Id. at 82.
51. Id. at 83.
52. Id. at 90.
53. Id. at 85 (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305).
54. Id. at 98.
55. Id. at 86.
56. Id. at 96.
57. Id. at 97-98.
58. Id. at 98.
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whose peremptory challenge was scrutinized in Batson, the three-
step process it outlined was created for that same scenario.
However, the procedure applies to the use of peremptory
challenges by both plaintiffs and defendants. For simplicity's sake,
this Note routinely refers to parties exercising peremptory
challenges as prosecutors, but the principles involved apply
equally to both sides.
Batson led to a series of U.S. Supreme Court rulings that
modified and extended the underlying principle.5 9 The Court
established that the race of the defendant did not matter, i.e., that a
white person could challenge the exclusion of black jurors, or vice
versa. It then endorsed the use of Batson challenges in civil
trials. 61 The Court also confirmed that a defendant, like a prosecutor,
cannot make racially discriminatory challenges.6 2 The U.S. Supreme
Court has since refined the analytical framework through which a
trial court must evaluate a Batson challenge. 63 In Miller-El v.
Dretke, the Court explained that racial discrimination could be
discovered using evidence outside the "four comers" of the case,
including: (1) a statistical analysis of the venire; (2) side-by-side
comparisons of the potential jurors; (3) historical discrimination by
the prosecution; and (4) whether the excluded juror was subjected to
disparate questioning. In Snyder, the Supreme Court employed one
of those methods: side-by-side juror comparison. The Court
compared three potential jurors, two of whom were struck
peremptorily and one who was eliminated through a backstrike; it
deemed the latter's dismissal discriminatory.
65
C. The Snyder Sequel
Allen Snyder was convicted of first-degree murder on August
29, 1996, and sentenced to death.66 On a vengeful rampage
motivated by marital infidelity, he killed the man his wife was
dating.67 Snyder and his wife, Mary, separated after Snyder had
59. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); J.E.B. v Alabama, 511 U.S.
127 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leeville,
500 U.S. 614 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
60. Powers, 499 U.S. 400.
61. Edmonson, 500 U.S. 614.
62. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42.
63. Miller-El, 545 U.S. 231.
64. Id. at 240-46.
65. Snyder II, 552 U.S. 472, 483-85 (2008).
66. Snyder 1, 750 So. 2d 832, 835-36 (La. 1999), cert. granted, 545 U.S.
1137 (2005).
67. Id. at 836.
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physically abused her several times.68 Snyder confronted Mary and
Howard Wilson, the murder victim, when he drove her home after
midnight on August 16, 1995.69 Snyder stabbed his wife nineteen
times and stabbed Wilson nine times.
70
Before Snyder's trial began, the prosecutor struck five black
people from the venire, beginning with Greg Scott and Thomas
Hawkins, Jr.7 1 The defense did not object but noted the excluded
jurors' race for the record.72 Defense counsel "felt that no 'pattern'
of exclusion had emerged because the State had accepted an
African-American juror, Jeffrey Brooks. 73
Brooks was in his final semester at Southern University in New
Orleans, and his academic program required him to teach 300
hours in order to graduate. At the beginning of voir dire, when
the trial judge asked members of the venire whether serving on the
jury would pose a hardship to any of them, Brooks was one of
more than fifty people who came forward. 75 He said that he needed
to student-teach five days a week.76 The trial judge offered to
speak to his dean, and Brooks accepted the offer. 7 The judge
called the college and told Brooks that the dean would allow him
to make up his missed time.78 Brooks expressed no further
concerns, and the prosecutor did not question him about his
reservations.79 Nevertheless, the prosecutor struck Brooks the day
after questioning him.
80
Under Batson, a defendant can make a prima facie showing
that a peremptory challenge was made on the basis of race by
establishing a pattern of strikes against black jurors.8 ' When a
prosecutor provisionally accepts a black juror and then strikes a
second, no pattern has been established. Snyder's defense attorney
objected when the prosecutor struck Brooks, who had already been
tendered by both sides.82 He was the fourth black person struck.83
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 840.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 839.
74. Snyder II, 552 U.S. 472, 478-82 (2008).
75. Id. at 479.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 480.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 479.
81. Id. at 475.
82. Snyder 1, 750 So. 2d 832, 840 (La. 1999), cert. granted, 545 U.S. 1137
(2005).
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When the prosecutor used his peremptory challenge to
backstrike Brooks, he offered the following explanation:
I thought about it last night. Number 1, the main reason is
that he looked very nervous to me throughout the
questioning. Number 2, he's one of the fellows that came
up at the beginning and said he was going to miss class.
He's a student teacher. My main concern is for that reason,
that being that he might, to go home quickly, come back
with guilty of a lesser verdict so there wouldn't be a
penalty phase. Those are my two reasons.
84
The defense attorney protested, saying that the student's
concern about missed classes had been resolved.8 5 "[E]verybody
out here looks nervous," he added. "I'm nervous."8 6 The trial judge
overruled his objection, saying only that he was going to allow the
peremptory challenge. The prosecutor then struck two more
black jurors, Elaine Scott and Loretta Walker. 8 The defense made
Batson challenges after each strike, and the prosecutor explained
that both women had indicated that they would be reluctant to
impose the death penalty.8 9 The trial judge accepted both of those
explanations as race-neutral. 90
Snyder was sentenced to death. 91 He appealed to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, contending that the trial court erred in allowing the
prosecutor to exercise five of his peremptory challenges against
black prospective jurors, in violation of Batson.9 2 The court
refused to consider the first two of those challenges because the
defense had failed to make the proper objection at the time the
jurors were struck.93 The lawyer therefore did not trigger the
Batson inquiry. The prosecutor offered no reasons, and the judge
did not rule on those strikes. Consequently, the supreme court
considered those claims waived.94 As to the other three struck
83. Id. at 863 (Lemmon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Synder 11, 552 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added).
85. Synder 1, 750 So. 2d at 863.
86. Id. at 840.
87. Snyder 111, 552 U.S. at 477.
88. Snyder 1, 750 So. 2d at 840.
89. Brief for The Capital Appeals Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant at 14-16, Snyder II, 552 U.S. 472 (No. 06-10119).
90. Id.
91. Snyder 1, 750 So. 2d at 836.
92. Id. at 839.
93. Id. at 841-42.
94. Id.
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jurors, the court accepted the prosecutor's justification. "None of
the reasons articulated by the State are readily associated with the
suspect class that is alleged to be the object of the State's
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges," said Justice Kimball,
writing for the majority in the five-two decision. 95
Snyder appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the Louisiana Supreme Court
for further consideration in light of Miller-El, which it decided just
days before.96 Upon reconsideration of Snyder in Snyder II, the
Louisiana Supreme Court again found no discriminatory intent in
the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, and the court
reaffirmed Snyder's conviction by a notably smaller margin, four-
three.97 Writing for the majority, Justice Weimer said that the
record "simply does not demonstrate that a reasonable factfinder
must necessarily conclude the prosecutor lied."98 Snyder again
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted his writ
application and ultimately reversed, seven-two.
99
D. A Tale of Three Jurors
In its final decision in Snyder III, the U.S. Supreme Court's
ruling relied on two side-by-side comparisons of three jurors: Jeffrey
Brooks, Roland Laws, and John Donnes.100 Brooks was backstruck;
Laws and Donnes were accepted. Brooks is black; Donnes and Laws
are white. 0 1 Each man noted previous commitments that would
clash with jury duty. 102 Brooks was one of more than fifty members
who expressed concern that jury service would interfere with work,
school, family, or other obligations.10 3 The Court drew an adverse
inference of discrimination because the prosecution decided to retain
Laws and Donnes but rejected Brooks.' 14
95. Id. at 842.
96. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer joined Justice Alito's majority opinion. Justice Scalia joined Justice
Thomas' dissent. The Court explained that a court may look beyond the "four
comers" of a case to examine purposeful discrimination, including juror
comparison. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005).
97. Snyder II, 942 So. 2d 484 (La. 2006), cert. granted, 551 U.S. 1144
(2007).
98. Id. at 499.
99. Snyder II, 552 U.S. 472, 486 (2008).
100. Id. at 482-84.
101. Id. at 483-84.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 473.
104. Id. at 484.
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The Supreme Court neither accepted nor rejected the
prosecutor's assessment of Brooks' demeanor. °5 The Court
acknowledged that deference is "especially appropriate" in the
context of a demeanor justification because, as the Louisiana
Supreme Court noted in Snyder II, "nervousness cannot be shown
from a cold transcript."' 0 6 However, such deference is appropriate
only when the trial judge has affirmatively accepted a demeanor
justification on the record, the Court ruled. '07 Because the trial judge
accepted both of the prosecutor's reasons without explanation, the
Court could not "presume that the trial judge credited the
prosecutor's assertion that Mr. Brooks was nervous."'0 8
The Court declared that the prosecutor's stated apprehension
that Brooks would be tempted to pursue a lesser verdict "highly
speculative. ' 1 9 Even if Brooks had been eager to return to the
university, that would not have necessarily caused him to pursue a
lesser verdict, the Court reasoned. 110 If most of the other jurors
favored first-degree murder, he might have agreed with them to
speed up the outcome."' Only if the majority of jurors had been
leaning toward a lesser verdict would an anxious Brooks be able to
quicken deliberations by his agreement.' 
12
Further, the Court noted that the prosecutor anticipated a quick
trial, which would have alleviated Brooks' concern about lost
student-teaching time. 113 The prosecutor struck Brooks on August
28, and the jury convicted Snyder on August 30, which would have
represented a total of two more lost days early in the semester. 1
4
The Court concluded that Brooks could have made up such lost
time easily."15 "When all these considerations are taken into
account," Justice Alito wrote, "the prosecutor's second proffered
justification for striking Mr. Brooks is suspicious. 9116
The Court then compared Brooks to Laws. 117 Like Brooks,
Laws approached the judge at the onset of voir dire to express his
105. Id. at 479.
106. Id. (citing Snyder I, 942 So. 2d 484, 496 (La. 2006), cert. granted, 551
U.S. 1144 (2007)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 480.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at483.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
974 [Vol. 70
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concern about jury service. 118 Laws was "a self-employed general
contractor" who had "two houses that [] [were] nearing completion,
one whose owners would be moving in that weekend."' 1 9 He also
told the judge that his wife recently had a hysterectomy, so he was
taking on extra parental duties, and the call to jury service was "bad
timing."''
20
Despite Laws' alleged hardship, the prosecutor asked him
whether he could work around his conflict.' 21 He asked Laws
whether, if he were seated on the iury, he would "try to make other
arrangements" as best he could. The Court noted that Laws'
obligations seemed "substantially more pressing" than Brooks'
student-teaching duty. 123 It questioned why the prosecutor did not
have the same concern that Laws would seek a lesser verdict in
order to end his courthouse commitment sooner. 124 Like Laws and
Brooks, John Donnes had cited a work-related hardship. 12 1 If called
to serve, he said, "I'd have to cancel too many things," including an
urgent appointment he allegedly could not miss.126 Despite this, the
prosecutor retained Donnes. 127 His treatment of Donnes and Laws
was apparently different from his treatment of Brooks.
The Court refused to consider whether the prosecutor's first
reason for striking Brooks, his alleged nervousness, would have
been sufficient by itself to justify a strike. 12 The Court did not
believe the prosecutor's second justification, Brooks' time
commitment. Because it drew an adverse inference of
discrimination, because the prosecutor referred to both reasons as
his "main concern," and because the trial judge did not explicitly
credit his demeanor justification on the record, the Court reversed
and remanded the case. 2 9 Although the Court did not single out
backstrikes as particularly objectionable, its action emphasizes the
practice as problematic.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 484.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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E. Backstrikes in Louisiana
The timing of peremptory challenges in Louisiana is governed
by Code of Criminal Procedure article 795, which codifies the
principles of Batson.1 30 Article 795 specifies that challenges "shall
be exercised prior to the swearing of the jury panel.'' Jurors are
sworn twice, however-once after they are accepted by the state
and defendant, and once after jury selection is complete) 32
Although it is somewhat ambiguous when peremptory challenges
may no longer be exercised, "swearing of the jury panel" implies
the later oath administered to the entire body rather than the oath
sworn by individuals. Therefore, a challenge can be lodged at any
time before the jury is impaneled.
Louisiana law governing the timing of peremptory challenges
has not been consistent. A 1986 amendment to the Code of
Criminal Procedure limited the time when a prosecutor could make
a challenge. It read: "A peremptory challenge may be made by the
state at any time before the juror is accepted by it, and by the
defendant at any time before the juror is sworn." ' 33 The provision
treated the timing for defense and prosecution differently, limiting
the prosecution's challenges to the time before acceptance. 134 The
article was amended in 1990, eliminating the restriction. 135 As the
Code's commentary notes, "there were too many exceptions which
created confusion and encouraged a contest between the
prosecution and defense."1 36 In a 1991 decision that interpreted the
amended Code of Criminal Procedure, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that a temporarily accepted and sworn juror "may
nevertheless be challenged peremptorily prior to the swearing of
the jury panel., 137
Historically, the right to peremptorily challenge jurors in
Louisiana ended when they were tendered and accepted by both
sides, but it was within the discretion of the trial judge to allow
130. Bobby Marzine Harges, Peremptory Challenges in Jury Selection in
Louisiana-When a "Gut Feeling" Is Not Enough, 54 LoY. L. REv. 95, 125
(2008); see also State v. Elie, 936 So. 2d 791, 795 (La. 2006).
131. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 795(b) (1998).
132. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 788, 790(1998).
133. 1986 La. Acts No. 323 (amending LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 795).
134. Id.
135. LA. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 795 (1998) (amended 1990).
136. Id. cmt. a.
137. State v. Watts, 579 So. 2d 931, 931 (La. 1991) (per curiam).
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what later became known as backstrikes.' 38 As the Code of
Criminal Procedure in 1937 stated:
After a juror has been accepted by both sides, neither side
has the right to challenge him peremptorily, but it shall be
within the discretion of the court, and not subject to review
to allow either side to peremptorily challenge jurors up to
the time that the jury is impaneled. "39
The Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized the limits of the right
to peremptorily challenge a juror in State v. Thornhill.140 In
Thornhill, the defendant appealed his murder conviction, citing the
state's peremptory challenge of a juror who had been accepted and
sworn. 4 1 The trial judge held that "either side has a right to
challenge a juror peremptorily up to the time of taking the
testimony."'14 The Louisiana Supreme Court said this ruling was
"stated too broadly" and needed "qualification.' ' 143 It held that if a
backstrike compelled a defendant to accept an "obnoxious juror, we
would not hesitate to set aside the conviction and sentence in such a
case, as both prejudice and injury to the defendant would be clearly
shown."' 44 Subsequent cases demonstrate that, although backstrikes
were discretionary, judges granted them routinely.' Backstrikes
became so pervasive that they evolved into a prerogative. 1
46
The availability of backstrikes in criminal cases is "established
beyond question" in Louisiana today. 147 However, backstrikes in
civil trials remain discretionary.' 48 The trial court in a 1998 tort
case refused to allow plaintiffs counsel to backstrike jurors, and
the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed its decision on appeal.
149
The supreme court recognized that some lower courts allowed
backstrikes in civil trials but others expressly prohibited it.' 5 ° The
138. State v. Thornhill, 178 So. 343, 348 (La. 1937) (citing LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 358 (1998)).
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., State v. Layton, 46 So. 2d 37 (La. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 839 (1950); State v. Rankins, 30 So. 2d 837 (La. 1947); State v. Boone,
195 So. 511 (La. 1940).
146. Riddle v. Bickford, 785 So. 2d 795, 800 (La. 2001).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 802.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 800.
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court concluded that a "party does not have a right to back-strike
jurors in civil cases ....
As the discrepancy between the treatment of backstrikes in
civil and criminal trials indicates, the basis for backstrikes is not
legal bedrock. The Louisiana Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant's right to peremptory challenges.' 5 However, nothing in
the state's Constitution grants or guarantees that right to the
prosecution. 5 3 The State's right to exercise peremptory challenges
is therefore "purely statutory."' 
54
The court's warning that backstrikes should not be allowed to
prejudice a defendant has faded from the law, but backstrikes now
have that prejudicial effect. For example, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed and remanded a first-degree murder conviction in
2007 because it held that a backstrike was discriminatory in State
v. Coleman.1 55 The prosecution in that case provisionally accepted
a black juror, Mason Miller. 156 It used peremptory challenges to
strike two other black jurors, then backstruck Miller.157 This was
the same pattern that emerged in Snyder.
Snyder spotlights the problematic nature of peremptory
challenges. It demonstrates the need for trial courts to take an
active role in resolving them, specifically by making explicit
findings. The case invites lawmakers, lawyers, and jurists alike to
reconsider what is permitted, and what is prejudicial, in culling the
venire. Ultimately, it should encourage Louisiana to tighten the
judicial reins on jury selection and eliminate backstrikes, a form of
peremptory challenge whose potential for abuse outweighs its
strategic advantages.
III. ANALYSIS: A PEREMPTORY PLOY
The Supreme Court's decision in Snyder did not address the
subversive effect of backstrikes, but this factor was relevant to the
outcome. The prosecution used the backstrike as a ploy to delay
the defense's Batson challenge, a tactic that is evidence of
discriminatory intent. The case shows that courts should apply the
strictest scrutiny to demeanor justifications, and it emphasizes the
need for trial courts to make their findings explicit. It demonstrates
151. Id. at 803.
152. LA. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("The accused shall have a right to full voir dire
examination of prospective jurors and to challenge jurors peremptorily.").
153. State v. Knox, 609 So. 2d 803, 808 (La. 1992).
154. Id.
155. 970 So. 2d 511 (La. 2007).
156. Id. at 514.
157. Id.
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that trial courts must take an active role in resolving Batson
challenges. Snyder implies that trial judges' determinations are due
little deference unless they are made on the record.
A. Complicated Calculus
Lawyers who lack valid reasons to use a peremptory challenge
may be motivated by stereotypes or other classifications. Because
voir dire offers lawyers little opportunity to gather information about
prospective jurors, they are likely to rely on group affiliations.' 59
One study of 191 claims of juror discrimination found that fifty-two
percent of the reasons for rejection involved group stereotypes. 160
For example, some prospective jurors were dismissed because they
were "from Texas" or an "inner city person."' 61 Attitudes and
personality traits are considered relevant to juror behavior and
decision-making, as well as demographic characteristics such as
occupation, wealth, religion, marital status, age, and ideology.
62
Scientific methods rate these factors according to values such as
persuasiveness, open-mindedness, verdict preference, and the
obstinacy to maintain one's verdict in the face of opposition from
other jurors, or "holdout status."' 163
But this complicated calculus leads to flawed conclusions when
it is based on erroneous assumptions. Studies "suggest that trial
lawyers are not very successful at identifying favorable and
unfavorable jurors during jury selection."' 164 Research shows few
clear relationships between juror characteristics and their decision-
making. 165 Evidence determines the overwhelming majority of
verdicts, not who the lawyers manage to seat in the jury box.166
Just as assessments based on stereotypes have questionable
accuracy, evaluation of jurors based on their ethnicity can yield
absurd results. One study instructed lawyers that the following
158. Charles L. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal To Eliminate Racially
Discriminatory Uses Of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1099,
1125 (1994).
159. Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About
Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 448 (1996).
160. Id. at 497.
161. Id.
162. REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE
JURY 121-50 (1983).
163. Id.
164. Melilli, supra note 159, at 499.
165. WALTER F. ABBOT & JOHN BATT, A HANDBOOK OF JURY RESEARCH 10-
2 (1999) (citing M. KASSIN & L.S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON
TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 29, 61 (1988)).
166. Id.
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ethnic groups could be ranked, respectively, from most to least
emotional: Irish, Jewish, Italian, French, Spanish, and Slavic.'
67
Nordic, English, Scandinavian, and German jurors were considered
"preferable if it is necessary to combat emotional appeals.' ' 168
Some evidence supports the proposition that jurors are more
sympathetic to defendants of their race.' 69 This stereotype may
encourage lawyers to rationalize discrimination; it could be
considered "effective advocacy" because its goal is impartiality.'
70
The lawyer may assume that, because he has what he believes to
be a logical basis, such a strike would not be racial prejudice. But
it is inherently flawed reasoning because racial solidarity cannot be
assumed; in fact, some minorities may feel a heightened
responsibility to judge members of their own race fairly.
Moreover, any such assumptions based on race alone are
inherently racist. It is "entirely repugnant to the values and
standards of the Constitution" to infer bias based on skin color. 171
A recent study confirmed that race influences the use of
peremptory challenges, but the study also found that such
discrimination is masked because the challenges are justified by
race-neutral reasons. 172 This is exactly what occurred in Snyder, in
which the prosecutor justified his backstrikes of black jurors with
race-neutral reasons.
B. Snookered by a Suspect Strike
Jeffrey Brooks, the college student whose strike ultimately led
to Snyder's reversal, was the first black juror selected for the jury
in that trial. 173 He was accepted by the prosecutor and the defense
attorney and was seated in the jury box during voir dire. 174 The
prosecutor accepted him on August 27 and backstruck him on
August 28, after striking two other black jurors. 175 An inference of
discriminatory intent can be drawn from this sequence of events
alone. Because the prosecution accepted one black juror before
167. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 162 (citing I. GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE
(1935)).
168. Id.
169. Melilli, supra note 159, at 452.
170. Ogletree, supra note 158, at 1104.
171. Id.
172. Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments,
Race-Neutral Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and
the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 269 (2007).
173. Snyder 11, 942 So. 2d 484, 493 (La. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
3004 (2007).
174. Id.
175. Snyder I, 552 U.S. 472, 481 (2008).
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striking another, no pattern of discrimination emerged until
Brooks' backstrike. As a result, the defense did not lodge a Batson
challenge when Hawkins and Scott were struck, and those
objections were later deemed waived.17 6 Therefore, the provisional
acceptance of Brooks can be seen as a ruse that obscured the
prosecutor's discriminatory intent. This apparent ploy did not
escape the Louisiana Supreme Court's notice.
"The prosecutor's action in accepting the first African-American
juror seems to have been a tactic to keep defense counsel from
raising Batson challenges to the subsequent exclusions," Justice
Johnson wrote in her dissent. 177 Justice Lemmon agreed with her.
"[T]he timing of the Brooks backstrike made the early acceptance of
Brooks suspect," he said.178 Justice Kimball, who wrote the majority
opinion in Snyder I, dissented in Snyder II and cited the backstrike
among her reasons. 1 She pointed out that the prosecutor, having
provisionally accepted Brooks, did not later question him regarding
his alleged anxiety over lost classwork.18 0 The state did not try to
"verify its hypothesis and develop an objective basis for the strike,"
she said. 1
81
The dissenters' concern illustrates that backstrikes become
more suspicious than initial peremptory challenges when used to
exclude minorities. Once a prosecutor accepts a juror, even
provisionally, he has indicated acceptance of that juror's demeanor
or impartiality. To strike a provisionally accepted juror encourages
an inference of concealed, or worse, disingenuous doubts. Justice
Johnson, who also dissented in Snyder II, likened the backstrike to
a process used in Texas that shifts prospective jurors within the
venire, essentially moving a panel to the back of the pack.18 2 This
practice was deemed discriminatory in Miller-El.' 3 "Louisiana
does not have the 'jury shuffle,' but we do have a practice that can
be used in an equally discriminatory fashion," Johnson said.'
8 4
176. Despite this deemed waiver, nothing in Batson suggests that an
objection must be raised as soon as the first African-American is struck. See
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and Recalcitrance: The Miller-El Remands, 5 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 131, 150 (2007).
177. Snyder 1, 750 So. 2d 832, 863 (Johnson, J., dissenting), cert. granted,
545 U.S. 1137 (2005).
178. Id. at 863 (Lemmon, J., dissenting in part).
179. Snyder I, 942 So. 2d at 500-01 (Kimball, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 502.
182. Id. at 508 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
183. Brian W. Wais, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Revisions To The
Batson Doctrine and Peremptory Challenges in the Wake of Johnson v.
California and Miller-El v. Dretke, 45 BRANDIEs L.J. 437,467 (2007).
184. Snyder II, 942 So. 2d at 508 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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In argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, Snyder's counsel
acknowledged that Brooks' backstrike essentially fooled Snyder's
trial attorney, preventing him from objecting earlier when the first
two jurors were struck. '75 Justice Ginsburg asked why the attorney
had not objected to the first two strikes, and counsel replied, "I
think basically the defense was snookered here."
18 6
Moreover, the prosecutor's initial pronouncement was
suspicious. He prefaced his explanation for his backstrike of
Brooks by saying, "I thought about it last night.' 8 7 The statement
implies that the prosecutor did not know, initially, why he wanted
to strike Brooks-he had to think about it first. His response
suggests that he first decided to use the peremptory challenge and
then devised his reasons. By letting a lawyer consider his strategy
overnight, the backstrike subverts the aim of requiring immediate
explanation. If a lawyer has a valid, race-neutral reason for using a
strike, he should be able to provide it immediately, or after
consulting his notes.1
8 s
Finally, the prosecutor indicated his duplicity by giving two
distinctly separate reasons. If his concern truly had been Brooks'
alleged eagerness to reach a verdict, he could have given that
reason alone. It was the second reason he gave, after citing Brooks'
"nervous" appearance, that indicates it was secondary-yet he
labeled both his "main" reason.' 9 Had he believed that Brooks
seemed nervous about missing school, he would not have
separated his reasons. His reliance on Brooks' demeanor as well as
Brooks' stated concern suggest deceit.
C. Delaying Justifications
The U.S. Supreme Court declined to credit the prosecutor's
impression that Brooks seemed "very nervous" because the trial
judge did not specifically accept that explanation. 90 But the Court
theorized it was possible that the trial judge "did not have any
185. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Snyder II, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (No.
06-10119).
186. Id. at 8.
187. Snyder Iff, 552 U.S. at 477.
188. A prosecutor "simply has got to state his reasons as best he can and
stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he gives." Miller-El v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231, 252 (2005). The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a "gut
feeling" is an inadequate explanation for a peremptory challenge, noting that it
is "most ambiguous and inclusive of discriminatory feelings." Alex v. Rayne
Concrete Serv., 951 So. 2d 138, 153 (La. 2007).
189. Snyder III, 552 U.S. at 478.
190. Id. at 479.
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impression one way or the other concerning Mr. Brooks'
demeanor. Mr. Brooks was not challenged until the day after he
was questioned, and by that time dozens of other jurors had been
questioned. Thus, the trial court may not have recalled Mr. Brooks'
demeanor."' 91 These dicta demonstrate another problematic aspect
of backstrikes-that they can insert a significant delay between the
strike and its perceived basis.
Delays make it more difficult and impractical for trial judges to
assess the demeanor of potential jurors and compare their
assessments with those of prosecutors and defense attorneys. Such
a task poses extreme practical difficulty. As the Court noted,
eighty-five prospective jurors were questioned during Snyder's
voir dire, and thirty-six survived challenges for cause; it was a two-
day process. 192 The duration of voir dire, and its potential to
process massive crowds, can make memories fade. Once a juror is
provisionally accepted, the judge and opposing counsel may forget
how that juror behaved.
A trial judge could note his own fleeting perceptions of each
juror, but he might be hard-pressed to verify another person's
impressions when they involve behavioral assessments that he did
not make. For example, a judge might write down that juror
number fifty-eight was "snappish," but he might not glimpse the
"hostile stare" to which a prosecutor refers on the following day.
The judge may not witness mannerisms while making notes,
questioning other jurors, or looking away. For these reasons, it is
nearly impossible for a trial judge to discredit a prosecutor's
demeanor assessment unless the peremptory challenge comes
during, or immediately following, the juror's questioning.
As the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Snyder tacitly
acknowledges, demeanor justifications are the weakest of race-
neutral reasons for a peremptory challenge. They are weakest
because they are subjective, unverifiable, and cannot demonstrably
be linked to legitimate trial strategy. 193 In other words, using them
most closely resembles the "arbitrary and capricious" form of the
peremptory challenge that has been restricted. 94 But Snyder does
not signify the total demise of peremptory challenges. By refusing
191. Id.
192. Id. at 475.
193. Batson explained that a race-neutral reason "must be one which is clear,
reasonably specific, legitimate and related to the particular case at bar." Alex,
951 So. 2d at 153.
194. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)).
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to credit or discredit the prosecutor's primary reason, the Court left
demeanor justifications viable. 195
D. Undercutting Deference
The Supreme Court's speculation that Snyder's judge may not
have remembered Brooks' demeanor diminishes the deference
established in Batson: "A trial judge's determination pertaining to
purposeful discrimination rests largely on credibility evaluations;
therefore the trial judge's findings are entitled to great deference
by the reviewing court."' 196 Because Snyder III appears to undercut
that standard, Justice Thomas said in his dissent that the Court's
decision "reveals that it is only paying lipservice to the pivotal role
of the trial court."' 97 He cited established principles that the
evaluation of a prosecutor's motives is a credibility determination
that the trial judge, through first-hand observation of the attorney
himself, is best able to make.' 98 When the "grounds for a trial
court's decision are ambiguous, an appellate court should not
presume that the lower court based its decision on an improper
ground, oarticularly when applying a deferential standard of
review.' '
9
Although this apparent willingness to question the lower
court's judgment signifies a shift in Batson doctrine, the change is
not drastic. Snyder does not hold that the Supreme Court will
second-guess all judges who accept demeanor justifications. It
does not demonstrate, as one commentator contends, the Court's
"strong reluctance to accept demeanor-based justifications."200
Snyder holds that a trial judge must make explicit findings on a
race-neutral reason to earn deference for his determination. The
Supreme Court held that a demeanor justification is not entitled to
deference if "the record does not show that the trial judge actually
made a determination" on that justification.20 1 Records do not
reflect jurors' body language, eye movements, or mannerisms,2 02
195. Louisiana courts have recognized "eye contact[, ... body language and
other sense impressions as important factors in decisions to exercise peremptory
challenges." State v. Seals, 684 So. 2d 368, 375 (La. 1996).
196. Snyder I, 750 So. 2d 832, 839 (La. 1999) (citing Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986)).
197. Snyder II, 552 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198. Id,
199. Id.
200. John M. Castellano, The Significance of Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct.
1203, 170 L. Ed. 2d 175 (2008), for Review of Batson Claims, LEXISNEXIS
EXPERT COMMENT., Sept. 2008, at 5.
201. Snyder II, 552 U.S. at 479.
202. See State v. Seals, 684 So. 2d 368, 375 (La. 1996).
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and the Court was unwilling to credit the trial judge's ruling
because it made no reference to Brooks' demeanor. The judge
accepted the prosecutor's two reasons but did not specify whether
he accepted both or only one. The Supreme Court declined to
speculate whether the prosecution would have struck Brooks on
the basis of his nervousness alone, but it did not indicate that it
would have rejected it.203
A prosecutor's assessment of a juror's demeanor can be refuted
by a Batson challenge, but Snyder's defense attorney did not
dispute that Brooks looked nervous. "Everybody out here looks
nervous," he said.204 This statement implies either that Brooks
looked no more nervous than anyone else or that his nervousness
was insignificant. It was not a denial, and therefore Brooks'
nervous appearance was not in doubt. But the significance of it was
in question, and the prosecutor should have explained how he
thought the nervousness was relevant. Because it assumed that the
trial court credited the prosecutor's second reason, the Supreme
Court did not defer to the judge, as the dissent pointed out.20 5 It
was unreasonable to presume that the trial judge relied on Brooks'
concern about missing class but not on Brooks' alleged
nervousness. 206 Because the judge said nothing to suggest that he
favored either explanation, it was unwarranted to presume he
credited one justification over the other.
The trial judge clearly accepted both of the prosecutor's
reasons equally because he failed to fully assess them.20 7 He did
not say anything to suggest that he found one reason more credible
than the other. If he had found one explanation doubtful, the judge
likely would have questioned the credibility of the prosecutor's
justification and articulated his concerns. If he had suspicions, he
should have asked the prosecutor to explain himself further. If the
judge had any doubts, he kept them to himself. His acceptance
signifies no doubt.
203. Snyder II1, 552 U.S. at 479.
204. Id. at 488.
205. Id. (Thomas, J., & Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 479.
207. Justice Ginsburg noted that the trial judge was "quite passive"; she
asked Snyder's attorney whether the judge was "present throughout the entire
voir dire," indicating she doubted whether he paid full attention. Transcript of
Oral Argument at 23, Snyder I, 552 U.S. 472 (No. 06-10119).
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E. The Meaning of Mixed Motive
Snyder obliquely addresses another aspect of the Batson
doctrine, the mixed motive. 2 08 The quandary this poses is whether
it would violate the Equal Protection Clause if a prosecutor gave
both a discriminatory and a non-discriminatory reason for a
peremptory challenge. Whether a race-biased reason would be
constitutional, if it were offered along with a race-neutral one,
remains an open question. Snyder does not address the issue head-
on but resolves it in the context of demeanor justification.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that, in other situations,
"once it is shown that a discriminatory intent was a substantial or
motivating factor in an action taken by a state actor, the burden
shifts to the other party defending the action to show that this
factor was not determinative." 20 9 In other words, a prosecutor who
gives two reasons for a peremptory challenge would have to show,
if one reason were deemed discriminatory, that it was not his main
motivation. But this burden-shifting has not been applied to the
Batson framework, and the Court declined to do so in Snyder.
210
However, the Court said a peremptory challenge substantially
motivated by discriminatory intent cannot be allowed based on
"any lesser showing by the prosecution.",211 The Court created a
new standard with this vague statement. It established that a race-
based reason corrupts an otherwise valid peremptory challenge. A
"lesser" race-neutral reason cannot salvage its constitutionality,
and a demeanor justification likely is a lesser race-neutral reason.
Discriminatory intent tends to taint a peremptory challenge that
is also motivated by legitimate concerns, as illustrated by a
hypothetical. Suppose a prosecutor offers several reasons after a
Batson challenge. He tells the judge that the challenged juror
appeared biased toward the defense, sneered at the prosecutor,
rolled his eyes, and gave evasive answers. Finally, he adds, "Oh,
and he is a black male, your Honor, and you know what that
means." As this hypothetical illustrates, none of the former
reasons, all of which could be valid, are likely to overcome the
prosecutor's final statement. The taint of racial consideration
overshadows the others. Each legitimate justification would be a
"lesser" showing. Whether a "greater" race-neutral reason could
cure a discriminatory defect remains unclear. The Court did not
208. Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives
and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 281-82 (2007).
209. Snyder 11, 552 U.S. at 484.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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clarify what type of justification would be "greater." Snyder shows
that a behavioral assessment such as "nervous-looking" will not
rebut an inference of discriminatory motive if the trial judge does
not explicitly accept it as justified.2 12 The implications of this
holding are untested but may prove far-reaching.
Trial judges, such as the jurist who presided in Snyder,
generally do not selectively reject part of a prosecutor's
enumerated reasons, and they do not prioritize them. Their
credibility determinations may rest as much upon their assessment
of a lawyer as they do upon his explanations. A judge who believes
a prosecutor is credible, or who finds his race-neutral reasons
credible may allow a peremptory challenge without ruling on the
reasons. 13 Therefore, a "lesser showing" of tacit acceptance will
be overcome by an appellate determination of discriminatory
motive in any one reason. To avoid overturned decisions and
eliminate this ambiguity, trial courts should make explicit findings
after a Batson challenge that specifically accept or reject each
element of a lawyer's explanation. In fact, the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure specifically mandates such findings.
214
Thorough judicial scrutiny, well-documented on the record, can
help to prevent potential peremptory challenge problems.
215
IV. CONCLUSION: STRIKING OUT
Because the peremptory challenge is misused, some
commentators have urged its swift demise.216 U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Marshall believed that the only way to end the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is to eliminate them
entirely.2 17 One federal judge declared in his ruling that it is "time
to put an end to this charade" because peremptory challenges "are
212. Id. at 479.
213. Id.
214. "The court shall make specific findings regarding each such challenge."
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 795(e) (1998).
215. As one commentator noted, "Ineffective scrutiny of prosecution
explanations is the single greatest problem hindering the effective
implementation of Batson." Ogletree, supra note 158, at 1110.
216. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 16, at 812; see also Antony Page,
Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge,
85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005); Amy Wilson, The End of Peremptory Challenges:
A Call for Change Through Comparative Analysis, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 363, 371 (2009).
217. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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a cloak for discrimination and, therefore, should be banned. ' '2 18 But
the Supreme Court was aware of Batson's limitations when it
issued that decision, and it shows no sign of abolishing the
mechanism more than twenty years later. Although it has refined
and redefined Batson, the Court has insisted that the limits it
imposed on the peremptory challenge "have not been intended to
eliminate, and will not have the effect of, eliminating [it]."219
A. Peremptory Power
Critics of the peremptory challenge tend to overlook its value
as a tool to protect the parties from discrimination. In Swain v.
Alabama, Justice White called it "one of the most important of the
rights secured to the accused., 220 Blackstone believed that
defendants who wielded it felt a measure of control because they
had a say about who would judge them.221 The peremptor
challenge enables parties to strike jurors who try to conceal bias.2A
It also serves as a "shield" when a challenge for cause fails,
preventing retribution by an alienated juror.223 Because the
peremptory challenge is a valuable tool, and because it is likely to
remain a fundamental aspect of procedure, calls for its abolition
are misguided and futile. It is best to adapt to Batson's framework
and conduct jury selection conscientiously, with a strong
awareness of what is permitted and what is required.
Snyder's chief significance is that it invites the state to
acknowledge the problem of misused and mishandled peremptory
challenges. One law professor has noted that in Louisiana, "the
prima facie case is often an insurmountable hurdle to the Batson
complainant." 224 If the hurdle is set too high, incomplete records
and insufficient findings by a trial judge will exacerbate or
218. Coburn R. Beck, The Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 961, 992 (1998) (citing Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y.,
925 F. Supp. 177, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
219. Melilli, supra note 159, at 455.
220. J. Christopher Peters, Georgia v. McCollum: It's Strike Three For
Peremptory Challenges, But is it the Bottom of the Ninth, 53 LA. L. REv. 1723,
1738 (1993).
221. Beck, supra note 218, at 998 n.220.
222. Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender
Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 27 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 695,
696 (1999) (citing B.A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving Its "Wonderful
Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 554 (1972)).
223. Id.
224. Melilli, supra note 159, at 466.
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contribute to the problem by hindering appellate review.225
Between Batson and Snyder, the Louisiana Supreme Court reached
the merits of defendants' Batson challenges in thirty-two cases,
and it granted relief in two of those.226 In those twenty years, the
state's appellate courts have reviewed 178 trial court denials of
defense Batson challenges and have granted relief in four of those
appeals. 227 These statistics demonstrate neither discrimination nor
improper ruling, but they show that successful appeal of a denied
Batson challenge is extremely rare and difficult. If, as Snyder and
other cases indicate, trial and appellate courts are improperly
overruling Batson challenges, it follows that other valid claims
may have been mistakenly denied.
Louisiana's Batson jurisprudence demonstrates that trial judges
generally do not make findings on a defendant's prima facie case
of discrimination.228 They typically do not give reasons for
denying a Batson challenge, and deference to their rulings is
usually granted even when no reasons are offered. 229 Tolerance for
these omissions poses an impediment to the successful appeal of a
legitimate Batson claim. For example, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed a burglary conviction in 2000 because it found that
the trial judge improperly ignored defense objections that
attempted to make a Batson challenge.230 In the case, State v.
Myers, the judge ignored defense objections and continued as if
they had not been made. "[T]he record in this case does not
support or explain the judge's dismissive attitude," the supreme
court said.231 The trial judge did not rule on the defendant's
objections and failed to "articulate a reason for his refusal to
require the State to produce race-neutral explanations.
232
Myers and Snyder emphasize the need for trial judges not only
to rule on a challenge, but also to articulate reasons.233 "It is
incumbent on the trial judge to address the challenge, either by
225. The Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers contends that
it is "virtually impossible for a criminal defendant to succeed in a review of a
Batson claim in Louisiana." Brief for Louisiana Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 12, Snyder III, 552
U.S. 472 (2008) (No. 06-10119).
226. Id. at 12.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. State v. Myers, 761 So. 2d 498 (La. 2000).
231. Id. at 502.
232. Id.
233. The Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that a judge's "rubber stamp"
approval of a race-neutral reason destroys the Batson objective. Alex v. Rayne
Concrete Serv., 951 So. 2d 138, 153 (La. 2007).
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ruling on whether a prima facie case of discriminatory intent has
been made or by requiring race-neutral reasons for the strikes."
234
Discrimination is a pervasive problem, too difficult to discern in a
transcript without findings. Race-neutral reasons are easily
supplied.235
Race can be a constant factor in jury selection decisions.
According to one commentator, "candor and honesty require us to
admit that there is not a decision that we make in terms of social
grouping that does not involve an analysis of race., 236 Moreover,
such analysis should be expected and anticipated because racism is
the persistent, pervasive legacy of America's slaveholding past.
237
Because racism can be subconscious, it may be futile to expect
lawyers to police their own motives. Snap judgments based on
physical characteristics or demographics other than race can be
proxies for racism, and a refusal to face one's own prejudice can
encourage self-deception. 238 For this reason, trial judges are
obligated to scrutinize all strikes of minority jurors. In addition,
judges and lawyers both must ensure a full, accurate record of the
proceedings.239  A recent Louisiana appellate court case
demonstrates this necessity. The fifth circuit reversed a looting
conviction in 2008 because omissions in the trial transcript
prevented the court from conducting a side-by-side juror
comparison. 24  Because of "substantial omissions" in the trial
234. Id.
235. See Covey, supra note 208, at 322. "If the court does allow shallow
explanations for arguably discriminatory peremptory challenges, then 'only a
very stupid litigant will ever lose a Batson claim."' Beck, supra note 218, at
996. See also Peters, supra note 220, at 1756. "Any well-trained and well-
prepared attorney should be able to give neutral explanations for the exercise of
a challenge when confronted with a claim of discrimination." Id.
236. "If American society as a whole is still struggling with the difficult
legacies left by slavery, subjugation, and misogyny, then it is unrealistic to
expect that those legacies have not made their way into the courtroom." Laura
Appleman, Reports of Batson's Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: How
The Batson Doctrine Enforces A Normative Framework Of Legal Ethics, 78
TEMP. L. REv. 607, 624 (2005).
237. Id.
238. "The inherent nature of the human mind then has the potential to cause
attorneys and parties to exercise their peremptory challenges without fully
comprehending their true reasons for using these challenges against particular
individuals." Wais, supra note 183, at 456-57.
239. One law professor suggests that lawyers should "articulate in detail the
nature of a challenge. Counsel should describe the number of people in the jury
venire" as well as the names, race, gender, and ethnicity of the excluded jurors.
See Harges, supra note 130, at 122.
240. State v. Cheatteam, 986 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2008).
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transcript, the court found the appellate record "so deficient" that it
could not properly review the case for Batson errors.
241
Finally, trial judges must make explicit rulings on Batson
objections, both on the establishment of a prima facie case and on
the ultimate evaluation of the proffered reasons' credibility. These
findings need not be detailed, but they are necessary to preserve
the record for appeal and for counsel to assess their own conduct.
Snyder's ultimate result likely would have been different if the trial
judge had said whether he agreed with both or either of the
prosecutor's reasons. The Supreme Court did not mandate these
findings, but they are beneficial and essential to a case's ultimate
resolution.
B. Backstrikes Must Be Banned
Backstrikes are unnecessary, illogical, and have no
constitutional basis; their potential for abuse far outweighs their
perceived advantages. To prevent discrimination as well as the
appearance of it, to avoid juror inconvenience, to forestall costly
appeals, and to restore confidence in its justice system, Louisiana
should abolish this backward practice.
Backstrikes are unnecessary because they do not advance or
achieve the aim of peremptory challenges. If a strike's purpose is
to prevent biased people from joining the jury, that goal is not
achieved by delaying their removal. Because jurors are not
questioned after they are tendered, they give no more testimony
once they are impaneled. Lawyers, therefore, have no more
objective information from which to discern a bias. Allowing them
to exercise strikes later allows them to change their minds, but this
flexibility injects an element of uncertainty into the process.
Lawyers have adequate opportunity to assess jurors' demeanors
before impaneling them.
It is senseless to allow backstrikes freely in criminal trials
while they are discretionary in civil trials. To empower a trial
judge to forbid backstrikes in a civil trial but deprive him of that
oversight in a criminal trial is indefensible. Because they may be
abused, backstrikes offer defendants less, not more, protection
from bias. When a member of his race is backstruck, a defendant
cannot demand that another be tendered. Because a criminal
defendant stands to lose liberty-or, in Snyder's case, life-he is
entitled to greater protection. The higher stakes demand greater
vigilance against unfairness and abuse.
241. Id. at 739.
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Backstrikes are "purely statutory," as they have no
constitutional guarantee.242 They are not consecrated by the
Constitution because they are not fundamental. Their legislative
history indicates they customarily were a matter of judicial
discretion, and state legislators have banned them before. They
should be viewed as a failed experiment, easily erased from the
statutory blackboard.
Backstrikes do have strategic advantages that may make
prosecutors and defendants reluctant to relinquish them, but their
potential for abuse overshadows their utility. Because a juror
typically is tendered first to the prosecutor, the prosecutor may
decline to strike one who he anticipates will be challenged by the
defense, a 2amble that allows him to preserve his allotted
challenges.24 A defendant may use the same ploy in the hopes that
the prosecutor will later backstrike the juror. By giving both sides a
second chance, each can use calculated risks to force the other
side's hand and maximize the utility of his challenges. This
purported advantage is in fact a disadvantage. The strategy of
saving challenges is inherently risky, and it encourages
gamesmanship that is more harmful than helpful when one side is
saddled with an "obnoxious juror." It may favor the more skilled
gambler, but the result remains unpredictable.
Without backstrikes, lawyers would lose the ability to withhold
a challenge in the hope that opposing counsel would exercise one.
Both sides would be forced to make a final decision up front,
ensuring stability and certainty in the gradual composition of the
jury. The restriction would affect both sides equally.
Backstrikes are useful to find the most preferable jurors. They
allow both sides to reform the makeup of the jury panel as it is
impaneled. Because a jury comprises as many as a dozen
individuals, its dynamic is subtly altered by the addition or
subtraction of each personality. This advantage is the backstrike's
strongest, but its strategic value is again dependent on chance. The
ability to replace an acceptable juror with a "better" one is only
useful when a stronger candidate is available. Without backstrikes,
defense and prosecution would be forced to devise a strategy with
fewer variables, making decisions to strike based on known
quantities (i.e., the impaneled jurors) rather than unknown ones.
Eliminating backstrikes would add stability to the selection process
242. State v. Knox, 609 So. 2d 803, 808 (La. 1992).
243. "A prospective juror may be tendered first to the state, which shall
accept or challenge him." LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 788 (1998). Jurors
are tendered simultaneously in some jurisdictions, which makes the strategy of
withholding peremptory challenges impractical.
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by ensuring that, once both sides have accepted a juror, that juror
would be impaneled.
Because backstrikes enable a lawyer to wait hours or days
before challenging a potential juror, they magnify each strike's
potential for misuse. If a lawyer intends to discriminate, he can
wait several hours or even days to concoct his strategy. The delay
allows a devious lawyer time to review a juror's answers and
consider his behavior at leisure, searching for a pretext. The delay
also weakens memories and may hinder opposing counsel's
resistance by surprise or overall deceit, as was the case in Snyder.
This potential for abuse overshadows any strategic advantage.
Backstrikes also make participating in jury service more
inconvenient and are likely to foster feelings of resentment. The
life of a backstruck juror such as Brooks, whose outside
obligations made his initial appearance onerous, is further
disrupted when he is called to court for another day, only to be
dismissed. To prospective jurors, such procedural antics justifiably
seem pointless. Without knowing the reason for his exclusion, the
backstruck juror must ask himself why the court and its officers
put him through the hassle. If that juror is a minority, he may also
wonder whether race played a role.
In this context, perception of racial discrimination is as
damaging as actual discrimination.2 4 4 Racism in jury selection
"casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process." It damages
"both the fact and the perception" that juries act as a vital check, 246
against the state's wrongful exercise of power. Even if they are
not motivated by discriminatory intent, backstrikes have the same
effect when used on minorities who suspect discrimination. They
leave court doubting the system's integrity. A potential juror
excluded because of race "suffers profound personal humiliation
heightened by its public character. The rejected juror may lose
confidence in the court and its verdicts as may the defendant if his
or her objections cannot be heard.' '247 Banning backstrikes will
prevent damaging reputational injuries to the defendant,
prospective jurors, and, ultimately, the system itself.
If jury service promotes respect for the law and judicial system,
exclusion from service may foster disrespect for them. Jury service
"preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards against
244. See Davenport, supra note 38, at 964. Even when there is no showing of
bias, "due process is denied by circumstances that create the likelihood or other
appearance of bias." Id.
245. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 413-14.
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the rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance of the
laws by all of the people., 24 8 When a minority juror believes he
was dismissed because of his race, especially when the defendant
also is a member of his race, his esteem for the judicial system and
its laws is certainly undermined.
C. Preserving Integrity and Fairness
The peremptory challenge is a powerful procedural tool that
can be used to prevent or preserve prejudice. It can be used to
perpetuate stereotypes and racial discrimination, but it also can
prevent partial jurors from slanting the scales of justice. It has
become fundamental, rooted in stare decisis and centuries of
jurisprudence. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly restricted
its use to ensure that it is wielded positively, but the Court is
unlikely to abolish it.
The backstrike, however, has more disadvantages than utility,
and it can be banished without any negative effects on justice or
jury impartiality. Lawyers may strongly resist having to relinquish
a procedural plaything, but it does not benefit parties any more
than normal peremptory challenges. The backstrike has no
constitutional basis because it is not a fundamental right. It
promotes distrust toward and resentment of the justice system by
people who are accepted and rejected without any explanation.
As Snyder illustrates, the backstrike can mask discrimination
and subvert the fairness that Batson is intended to ensure. But the
backstrike also undermines the integrity of the judicial system in
the eyes of every juror who sees its use as suspicious. Just as the
U.S. Supreme Court saw racial prejudice in Snyder where the
Louisiana Supreme Court did not, reasonable minds will differ
about whether discrimination is present. Human perceptions are
inherently imperfect, and the prism of discrimination can distort
perceptions drastically. Courts should strive to avoid even the
appearance of bias, which can reflect racism even when it is
neither intended nor effected. To preserve the justice system's
integrity and foster fairness, the backstrike should be struck.
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248. Id. at 407.
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